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Abstract
This paper reflects on the establishment of an Ethics Education Programme for school
pupils aged between five and sixteen years who opt out of Catholic Religious Educa-
tion in Malta. It needs to be seen in the light of the changing demography of Malta and
the increasing secularisation of the country, as well as to the growing racism,
islamophobia and rejection of the Other to be found all over Europe (and of course
beyond). We question if the Ethics Education Programme, in its commitment to
‘totalising’ western ideals of rationality, autonomy, and universal values, is itself rooted
in discomfort with the Other and constitutes a form of ethical violence. The work of
Emmanuel Levinas on Otherness, sameness and violence is central to this paper.
Keywords Ethics education Programme inMalta .Maltese public schools . Levinas .
Otherness . Violence
Introduction
Malta, in 2012, witnessed the birth of a new National Curriculum Framework (NCF). It
was the first time that a policy document raised the issue of non-Catholics and/or non-
religious pupils in public schools participating in the learning of religious education.
The NCF argued that these pupils should be given a substitution for missing out Roman
Catholic religion lessons. Its authors argued that an Ethics Education Programme (EEP)
should be provided (see Ministry of Education, Employment and the Family 2012, 8).
Such a recommendation needs to be seen within the Maltese context where the Roman
Catholic Church has a long-standing influence within all levels of society.
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Malta aspires to be a progressive European Union country when it comes to civil
liberties, yet the Church’s influence on much of Malta’s populace and political
decision-making remains very strong. Freedom of religion is pronounced in Malta’s
Constitution (1964), yet Article 2 of Chapter I of the Constitution states that, (1) The
religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion; (2) The authorities of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the duty and the right to teach which principles
are right and which are wrong; and (3) Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all public schools as part of compulsory education.
Moreover, the scholastic calendar is moulded around Catholic feast days, and most
schools have reserved spaces within their premises and schedules for Catholic worship-
ping (Darmanin 2013). According to Borg and Mayo (2006), the Catholic culture has
been allowed access to public schools and was permitted to work through intellectuals,
such as teachers, curriculum administrators and textbook authors, to breed its privileged
position within society. Schools conduct much of their activities to fit the needs of their
Catholic students and families, as if the Maltese people were ‘an undifferentiated mass,
a unitary subject, with one belief system’ (Borg and Mayo 2006, 44).
Schools in Europe are becoming increasingly culturally and religiously diverse due
to the fluidity brought about by recent changes. There has been a large influx of mostly
economic immigrants and also asylum seekers that impacted the composition of
Maltese schools. The Maltese National Statistics Office (2018) found that foreign
students from kindergarten to secondary school have more than doubled in five years,
now making up 10% of the school-age population (Calleja 2019). While the most
significant number of foreign students come from EU Member States, African and
Asian pupils register the most significant increase. More than half of these foreign
students in Malta attend public schools (Calleja 2019).
It can be argued that there is now equity for non-Catholics and non-religious pupils in
those Maltese public schools that started to provide Ethics Education lessons as an
alternative to Catholic Religious Education (CRE). However, this paper questions: How
does the teaching of Ethics respond to the otherness of the Other? Secondly, does the
EEP itself create processes of otherness and othering in schools? This paper will analyse
data from a qualitative study that interviewed teachers of Ethics. The data is analysed
using a theory-led thematic analysis based on the work of Emmanuel Levinas whose
ideas are used to question how otherness is constructed in relation to sameness in the
teaching of Ethics as a subject, and how this constitutes a form of violence.
The next section in this paper will provide a deeper context to the teaching of Ethics
by focusing on the philosophy that underpins the EEP, followed by a discussion of
some of Levinas’ ideas. The main section of the paper will then focus on analysing the
data from the interviews through a Levinasian lens.
The ethics curriculum
The Ethics Programme aims to address the diverse religious and secular moral beliefs,
traditions and cultures of students. As is suggested by the Learning Area Outcomes
Framework for the subject, the programme perceives such differences as ‘valuable and
something to celebrate’ and ‘tolerate’ (Ministry for Education and Employment n.d.).
The Ethics Programme affirms the position that a just and well-ordered pluralistic
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society can only work well when people know one another, understand one another and
get along agreeably. Consequently, the associated pedagogical approaches highlight the
rational side of human relations and make use of notions such as empathy, tolerance,
social contract and mutual understanding to bring about what the subject deems an
ethical coexistence. A zone is said to be created where students are encouraged to listen
to others, to think reflectively on different beliefs, experiences and ideas, to clearly
communicate their positions about issues and respond to others in a respectful way.
The EEP adopts a philosophical approach. It does not only sensitise students into
knowledge and understanding of the moral domain but, presents ethics as a process of
thinking and reflective practices that help students become skilful in ethical inquiry and
action. Such an understanding of ethics involves encouraging students to live, in
Socratic terms, an ‘examined life’ (see Wain 2016), by providing them with the
opportunity to think about traditional values, as well as pay careful attention to their
own private beliefs and consider the ethical dimensions of their experiences concerning
oneself and others. Furthermore, a philosophical approach to the EEP could be
regarded as the exercise of Aristotle’s phronêsis (see Wain 2014), or what may be
translated into practical wisdom. It signifies the habit of making the right decisions and
taking the right actions in context, coupled with the never-ending quests of excellence
for the common good. As John Dewey (1960), to whose theories the Ethics Curriculum
owes much, notes,
Moral theory begins, in germ, when any one asks, “Why should I act thus and not
otherwise? Why is this right and that wrong? What right has any one to frown
upon this way of acting and impose that other way?” Children make at least a
start upon the road of theory when they assert that the injunctions of elders are
arbitrary, being simply a matter of superior position. (5)
Following Dewey’s line of thought, proponents of ethical inquiry stress that students
who engage philosophically with ethical norms concerning their own experience will
comprehend that there are different conceptions, principles and ways of looking at
things. They will also realise that these can come in tension with each other.
Throughout Western history, people have made use of normative ethical theories
(virtue ethics, consequentialism, rights-based and Kantian ethics) to make and
substantiate their moral judgements. Philip Cam (2016) argues that when students are
made aware of how these normative ethical theories have been utilised in different times
and places, they will ‘enlarge [their] social, cultural and historical knowledge and
understanding’ (11). They will also ‘learn to deal with the sources of disagreement over
ethical matters in their own society’ (Cam 2016, 11). Similarly, Wain argues that the
Ethics Programme would help students realise that disagreements are ‘endemic to a
society that values freedom of belief and that tolerates cultural difference’ (Wain 2016
para.5). The EEP, as a philosophical practice, is described as non-denominational,
which means it does not seek to shape pupils’ ethical beliefs and conduct or conform
their beliefs and demeanour to conventional norms. This does not imply that the Ethics
teacher needs to disregard or pass conventional norms as irrelevant; instead, she should
involve pupils to think critically, reflectively and creatively about them.
The Ethics Curriculum acknowledges that ethical inquiry is not ‘purely a cerebral
affair’ (Cam 2012,82). In addition to thinking critically and thinking creatively, it
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involves what Matthew Lipman calls ‘caring thinking’ (Lipman 1995; Lipman 2003), a
kind of thinking which focuses on the social aspect of human personality and which
takes place when pupils think collaboratively together. Pedagogically, the Ethics
curriculum borrows considerably from the practice of Philosophy for Children and its
central interpretation of the classroom as a Community of Inquiry. Wain (2016)
describes a community of inquiry as,
[…] one that values discussion, dialogue, debate, the exchange of ideas and
outlooks in social environment which is free and safe and where participants feel
that they and their views are respected; it is, therefore, a community of friends.
The community is a place where understanding is built and consensus valued, but
also a place of non-violent struggle where arguments are owned, if at all, by
persuasion. (para.4)
Following this conception of the Ethics Programme, we ask what the impetus for Ethics
Education is. Is it a genuine concern to respond to the religious other, or is it driven by
an underlying political ideology which functions to domesticate cultural and religious
differences to preserve Western democracy and its values? Does Ethics Education feed
into an assimilative discourse which supports the idea of Europeanness, democratic
enculturation and adaptation?
Introducing Levinas
This section serves as the theoretical backbone of the study. Levinas asserts that the self
comes into existence through the call of the Other.1 His proposition counters the
Cartesian Western philosophical thought summed up in the proposal ‘I think; therefore,
I am’. Levinas takes issue with the logocentric perspective of the Western philosophical
tradition for generating a totalistic discourse that dominates and reduces the otherness of
the Other to sameness and identity. To overcome this, Levinas accords primacy to an
asymmetrical relationship between self and Other, whereby the Other is privileged. This
ethical recognition of the Other becomes the only way through which we can coexist in a
peaceful and just way. In this relationship, the self, or I, is held hostage to the Other’s
otherness because I am responsible not to appropriate or assimilate the Other to my
worldly spheres. Levinas insists that ontology (that is, the nature of being) constitutes ‘a
reduction of the other to the same’which is done through an ‘interposition of a middle or
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being’ (Levinas 1969, 43). The Other
becomes a problem for me to be solved. Interpreting Levinas, Brian Treanor (2006),
describes the assimilating forces that shape our minds and practices, as follows:
The shock of the encounter with otherness is mitigated by interpreting it through
the mediation of this neutral third term, which makes it understandable by placing
otherness within the known categories of the system. I see the other as “like me”
1 Levinas, very often, capitalises the word Other to highlight the asymmetry of relations whereby the Other is
always above and before me, summoning me to respond to his call. The word “Other” in its capitalised form,
used in this paper, reflects Levinas’s notion of alterity and asymmetry.
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in some respects and “unlike me” in others, but both these ways of seeing the
other are in terms of “me”. After the initial shock of the otherness is reduced in
this manner, the otherness is completely dominated by the assignation of meaning
to the other in relation to my projects – by naming the other. For example, I begin
to think of the other as “my student”, “my colleague” or “my doctor”. (16).
This neutral third term is totalising for Levinas. Simon Critchley (as cited in Critchley
and Bernasconi Critchley 2004) explains that the totality which Levinas speaks about is
characterised by my tendency to grasp the unfamiliarity of the other through general
concepts. This grasping would eventually lead me to perceive the Other as a reflection
of myself, who looks to the world in the same way as I do. I grasp the other in terms of
‘understanding, correlation, symmetry, reciprocity, equality, and […] recognition’
(p.13). In my eyes, the other exists only in her generality and never in her individuality
(Levinas 1969, 44).
For Levinas, ethics is more than a recipe which one shall follow to live a ‘good’ life.
It is instead a radical rethinking of what it means to be human. Unlike Immanuel Kant,
he does not conceive ethics as my duty to choose to be good. Instead, Levinas insists
that I am called to be ethical before I can decide about it. Levinas, thus, reverses the
Western idea that positions ethics in personal autonomy, to reorient it as ‘first philos-
ophy’. He reconsiders the primacies of Western philosophy to affirm that ‘the opposi-
tion between “is” and “ought” is neither valid nor even possible’ (Peperzak 1995, xi).
Ethics as first philosophy is, after Levinas, understood as ‘a relation of infinite
responsibility to the other person’ (Critchley 2004, 6). Levinas’s philosophical project
is not intended to provide a new ethical system or a specific set of rules but, is instead
an inquiry into a relationship where the other constitutes my subjectivity and holds me
hostage.
To be human is, according to Levinas (1969), to be ‘infinitely responsible’ for the
Other without expecting the Other to do the same in return (244). It is I who is
responsible for the Other and all Others, and this responsibility forms my subjectivity.
When I accept responsibility for the Other, and all Others, and the unfreedom which it
involves, I actualise my nature as an ethical being (Blake et al. 1998, 65). Thus, I am
moral and free only when I respond to the call of the Other with ‘here I am’ (Chalier
2002, 78–79). Levinas posits responsibility for the Other as the necessary bedrock of
subjectivity. As he puts it, ‘I understand responsibility as responsibility for the Other,
thus as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or
which precisely does not matter to me, is met by me as face’ (Levinas 1985, 95). Before
the Other, I have no choice but to be responsible for her. This is because I cannot be
freed from responsibility. It is inescapable. ‘To discover in the I such an orientation is to
identify the I and morality’ (Levinas 1986, 353). For Levinas, this asymmetrical
relationship is a departure from myself to the Other without any return to the self. In
highlighting this asymmetrical relationship, he often fondly quotes Alyosha Karamazov
in ‘The Brothers Karamazov’ by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, where he says, ‘we are all
responsible for everyone else – but I am more responsible than all the others’ (as cited
in Kearney 1984, 67). However, Levinas clarifies that Alyosha’s view of responsibility
does not mean that every individual is more responsible than all the Others because that
would imply a degree of reciprocity. It is solely I who is responsible more than the Other,
and also for everyone else’s responsibility (Levinas as cited in Kearney Kearney 1984,
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67). During an interview with Philippe Nemo, Levinas was asked, ‘but is not the Other
also responsible in my regard?’, to which Levinas replies, ‘perhaps, but that is his affair.
[…] I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it’
(Levinas 1985, 98). We have ‘no choice’ (Levinas, as cited in Hand Levinas 1989, 247).
It is precisely because of my lack of freedom regarding my choice to be responsible or
not, that Levinas (1981) describes ethical responsibility as anarchy. In his words,
‘anarchy is not disorder as opposed to order’ (Levinas 1981, 101). If we act responsibly,
it does not mean that we follow the tenets of anarchism, as a political organisation
(Critchley 2007), where we engage in a process that ‘has no conductive principle or
rationality… [and as such] is…without direction’ (Dussel 1985, 61). Instead, Critchley,
elaborating on Levinas’s notion of the term, argues that anarchy refers to ‘the negation of
totality’, which requires us to distance ourselves from the traditional ways of doing
things and continually question our thinking and practices, to avoid ‘the affirmation of a
new totality’ (Critchley 2007, 122). Such an understanding of anarchy is, therefore, of
value. In this view, responsibility is anarchic, in the sense that before the self has any
consciousness or choice in the matter, responsibility imposes itself onto the subject.
Faced by such imposition, the subject is taken by surprise.
But who is this Other that Levinas insists so much upon? For Levinas, the Other
means any other person who is not me. In everyday life, we encounter many Others.
We either meet them directly or experience their traces. However, Levinas uses the
singular Other to accentuate that we meet Others one at a time, face to face. Here,
Wayne Veck (2014) argues that it is necessary to indicate that the way Levinas
conceives the Other is very different from the considerable academic discourse about
the Other. In such discussions, the Other belongs to social categories deemed to be
‘Other-than-normal’, and as such needs to be kept at a distance from the “normal-us”.
With reference to Sharon Todd (2003), Veck argues that the Other ‘does not simply
mean a sociological “other” who is marginalised or maligned’, because as mentioned
above, the Other is a mystery who resists assimilation (Veck 2014, 455).
The research process
This study consisted of in-depth interviews with teachers of Ethics to get a better sense of
the questions, queries and assumptions concerning the reality out there in schools. The
decision to interview teachers was based on the fact that they could provide first-hand
accounts of themulti-layered nature of internal otheringwhile also discussing pedagogical
possibilities that promote hospitality towards the alterity of the Other. This research was
part of a post-graduate degree followed by the first author, who, in the course of her
research, shifted from teaching primary education to ethics at middle school level.
Following permission from the University of Malta Research Ethics Committee, two
teachers (working with children aged between five and sixteen years) volunteered to be
interviewed in-depth, three times each. The interviews were developmental and semi-
structured to allow for further elaborations by the teachers and offer denser accounts. In
this way, both interviewee and interviewer could formulate and articulate the web of
meanings that construct an understanding of the Other, otherness and the self. Consid-
ering that the interview questions were informed by the philosophy of Levinas and also
that some of the questions related directly to his philosophy, it was appropriate to share
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the interview guide with the teachers a few days before each face-to-face interview. The
interviews produced an extensive body of text that was thematically analysed from a
Levinasian ethical perspective. This required the authors to become, in Janice Morse’s
(2002) words, as ‘theory smart’ as possible prior to the analysis, since it was not the type
of analysis which centres on themes that arise naturally from the data. However, the fear
of violating the data by imposing pre-decided themes was prevalent and very uncom-
fortable, mainly because the same theoretical framework warns against the imposition of
rationality on the Other.
Discussion of three themes
Several themes emerged when analysing the interviews from a Levinasian perspective;
however, for the purpose of this paper, three themes will be discussed.
Theme one: Perpetuating a culture of performativity
I have been told that if there are no more exams, then ethics will become a soft
option. So, technically, let’s face it, it serves the system [emphasis added by
interviewee]. Pupils, I think, would become more relaxed and enjoy it more if
there were no exams. Even the teacher would not feel so stressed. But, unfortu-
nately, since we are all the time paranoid about comparing it with Religion
teaching, we tend to follow what Religion curriculum does. So we introduce
exams.... It’s definitely not teacher-friendly… I know of refugee students who are
seeking help in learning-hubs. So a project might not be really and truly [done] by
the student; many factors come at play. (Quinn)
The teaching of Ethics was made examinable so as not to be seen as a soft option in
comparison to Religious Education (Montebello and Muscat 2014), highlighting the
instrumentalisation aspect of the subject. The teacher’s choice of words, ‘it serves the
system’, ‘so stressed’, ‘not teacher-friendly’, ‘causes pressure’, reveals the rising stress
experienced by Ethics teachers to align students with the predetermined learning goals
and have them submit their coursework for assessment purposes. Moreover, they know
that, ultimately, they share a degree of responsibility for the students’ final marks, and
might eventually have to justify themselves with parents, school management team, or
educational officers. Teachers end up, as Quinn puts it, ‘like a hamster looping the
loop’. We, thus, question whether teachers, as Gert Biesta (2017) puts it, become
‘servants of the system’, rather than ‘key agents’ in the educational venture.
One might argue that, when performativity urges teachers to retain responsibility for
pushing students toward the learning outcomes successfully, they might become less
concerned with creating educational spaces, where they, as well as students, can engage
with each other beyond that which is already determined. According to Ruitenberg
(2010), ‘outcomes-based education is, by design, inhospitable’ (271). This is because
an approach to teaching and learning that is concerned with what learning should be
and should be for is alien to that which is yet to come - the unforeseeable. This is
particularly the case for the Ethics Programme, where self-reflection, regarding what
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decisions ought to be taken, requires time and cannot be neatly pre-determined.
Outcomes-based education has, thus, ethical implications, as it does not provide space
for a genuine encounter with difference and with what is yet to come (see Attard et al.
2016). Moreover, although being aware that at times their actions are discriminatory,
the research participants felt disempowered to challenge the status quo due to account-
ability issues, linked to the imposed task-orientedness and the students’ abilities.
Assessment comprises coursework and an end-of-year exam. The nature of the
coursework’s activities varies, yet any coursework or exam requires a high degree of
cognitive functioning. We question whether assessing students who are not well
articulated, have language barriers or have a culturally different understanding of
knowledge, risks othering them. Corinne, the other interviewee besides Quinn,2 ex-
plains some of the challenges she has encountered in her Ethics classrooms as follows:
Many of the students are not able to write, not able to read. How can they, thus,
ever do well? If the assessment is done orally, those students would still not be
able to use the desired terminology. Same goes for foreign students [who]
struggle with both Maltese and English. The fact that Ethics is being assessed
causes many issues that are not easy to be addressed.
The above suggests that the way the Ethics Programme is being implemented in
schools, particularly the aspect of assessment, is putting undue pressures on both the
teacher and her students to perform, neglecting the ethical necessity of responding to
otherness. Moreover, challenges also arise due to the nature of the subject, which
requires students to possess cognitive faculties. Biesta (2017) observes that philosoph-
ical work ‘can work quite well for children who can handle words and arguments,
concepts and conversations, but far less so for children who are not “there”’ (421).
Biesta’s argument can also be extended to raising concerns about the cultural and
social dimensions of learning. Kirova and Prochner (2015), refer to several studies
conducted within minority and non-Western contexts, to argue that the way children
learn is deeply embedded in their cultural and social backgrounds. Socio-economically
disadvantaged children are more likely being raised in a context where ‘learning relies on
observation and participation in everyday life alongside parents and older, more experi-
enced members of the child’s community’ (Kirova and Prochner 2015, 387). In this so-
called paediatric model, the teaching of morality is distinct from the pedagogical one,
which characterises Western learning approaches in schools. The former model does not
promote, for instance, discussion, debates, questioning, and reading, which are intrinsic
elements of the Ethics classroom. Instead, oral storytelling and respect for authoritative
figures are favoured. Considering the above, one can question the extent to which the
Ethics classroom can cater to culturally and even socially diverse groups of students.
Quinn recalls an episode in which she tried to respond to the language needs of one
of her culturally diverse students, who have difficulties expressing themselves in
English or Maltese:
When there is a big, big problem, I try to find a translator to translate to the boy or
girl […] It happened. But then, I wasn’t really sure whether the translator is really
2 Teachers names are pseudonyms.
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translating what the girl or boy is saying rather than what…he might be telling his
own opinion, for example, and I cannot get to know… It also depends on whether
the student really wants to get a translator. It happened that, for the first year, this
boy was willing to be the translator, but the next year he grew disinterested. He
didn’t want to act as a translator any longer. I tried to bribe him with a certificate
[laughing].
Quinn’s decision to involve her students in responding to the needs of their culturally
diverse peers can be interpreted as a showcase of her responsibility towards the
particularities of students. While acknowledging the limitations, and perhaps the
impossibility of overcoming the challenge, motivated by the necessity to respond,
she opens up to uncertainty. Without negating the fact that Quinn could also have been
driven by the need to assess the students, it can also be argued that she took her
responsibility to a relational level to overcome the cultural obstacles, leading to inequity
in the classroom.
Theme two: Empathy
As already mentioned earlier, the Ethics Programme identifies empathy as a pivotal
emotion and salient prerequisite to promote the idea of ethical responsibility towards
the Other. Both the Maltese Curriculum and the EEP consider empathy as a cognitive
habit that should be taught as early as possible (see Kienbaum 2014) in order to
cultivate moral reasoning. If empathy can be taught, then teachers can assess its
development, as is suggested by the measurable learning outcomes for the Ethics
Programme (see Ministry for Education and Employment 2015).
The learning outcomes approach calls for Ethics teachers to use ‘a number of diverse
resources, such as visual materials, e.g. stories, documentaries and dramatisations; and
written materials, e.g. short stories, plays, novels, poems, case-studies [and] reports’, to
facilitate the empathic process ( 2015, 29). It assumes that these resources will assist
pupils’ understanding of the most profound dimensions of the other person’s point of
view and ‘be able to put [themselves] in the position of others, and grasp their
perspectives and feelings” (Siegel 1990, 43). They will also assist pupils in replicating
the experiences of the Other empathically.
From the data of this research, we ask if it is indeed possible to take the perspective
of a real or fictional character and imaginatively replicate her subjective experience.
Secondly, we question how Ethics teachers can ensure that an empathic understanding
of the Other is being achieved within the classroom. Both interviewed teachers think
that empathy offers possibilities for children; however, they also stress that we can
never fully empathise with the differently situated Others. Thus, they claim, empathy
proves challenging to teach.
Well, you do your best to impart the value of empathy to the pupils – that is, the
capacity to put yourself into someone else’s shoes. But, let’s say you try to
understand and empathise, do you succeed to step into someone else’s shoes if
you have not experienced the situation yourself? If it’s not first-hand, I do not
think you can empathise a hundred per cent. How can you ever achieve this?
(Corinne).
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The above quote reflects the significance of the uniqueness of experiences which,
however, could eventually point towards the impossibility of complete empathy.
Quinn, though, clarifies her thought by stating that contextual information could help
us empathise, albeit not wholly, better with the different Other. At this point, one could
argue that holding your experiences as personal is not reason enough to discard the
possibility of empathy. After all, as Todd (2003) acknowledges, we all, to some degree,
engage in projections of some kind or another. We do attempt to imagine how others
feel in one situation or another, and this could trigger us to reach out to individuals or
groups who need help. For instance, Todd (2003) argues that teachers often try to ‘feel
with their students’ in order to get an understanding of how to act in their students’ best
interests. Kosmos Sobon (2018) writes ‘a student’s burden becomes the burden of the
teacher. Any errors, omissions, ignorance, delinquency, disharmony, success and even
the happiness of a learner is the responsibility of a teacher’ (161). However, the
teachers go on to say that we should never assume that what we think how others feel
is indeed what they feel (Todd 2003). This unreachability comes across very strongly in
the teachers take on empathy. Although Quinn makes reference to the significance of
information for an empathic understanding of the other, it seems that it is the unique-
ness of the experience (not lack of knowledge) that is responsible for the inconceiv-
ability of empathy.
The conception of empathy endorsed by the Ethics Programme might have Ethics
teachers trust that empathy is what gives their students access to the lives of others, who
are differently situated. It is through empathy that they feel connected to the under-
privileged and marginalised others and that a sense of social justice is triggered.
Moreover, the curriculum provides plenty of avenues where an empathic understanding
could be incorporated. As a result, through various pedagogical means, teachers
regularly ask students to experience a mode of ‘being-with’ others who come from
culturally underprivileged backgrounds (Todd 2003, 47). In such cases, students are
required to enter the mind-frame of children and young adults, whose rights are
violated through, for example, the exploitation of labour, early marriage, oppressive
governments, and hostility towards them seeking refuge. The Others awaiting an
empathic response, often, are persons whose alterity is different from the students in
the classroom. Nevertheless, teachers seem to trust the capacity to be moved and
touched by another life’s story and expect from the students some transformation and
responsible commitment towards social justice causes. However, as the participants
argued, this process is never easy.
Let us consider Corinne’s pedagogical exercise as she narrates the following in her
interview. Focusing on Children’s Rights and using a video documentary, her students
are asked to identify with the feelings of Pakistani children (as young as six years olds)
who are forced to work as bonded labourers in the carpet-weaving industry. The
documentary depicts how vulnerable families, crippled with extreme poverty, trade
their children for the equivalence of ten Euros to work in servitude as carpet weavers to
pay off the family’s debts. Children ‘sell’ fast in the carpet industry for two reasons.
Firstly, their small, nimble fingers are ideally suited to hand-weave threads. Secondly,
children are more easily than adults controlled and compelled to work long hours for
little money, in illegal and unjust conditions, every day. For these children, the prospect
for compulsory education is non-existent, and, sadly, most of them die while enduring a
miserable life, as a result of poor health and exhaustion.
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Corinne hopes that, by seeing theway children bonded in labour live, students will stand
a better chance to understand them, and, eventually, build a more just and safer world,
where everyone is accorded equal treatment, respect and dignity. Corinne links the
experiences of the Pakistani children in the documentary with the realities of children
forced to work for major sports brands favoured by her students. She wants to make them
aware that child labour is closer to home than they realise. They, too, are indirectly involved
in this exploitation whenever they buy a football or a pair of trainers from companies which
employ children for a higher profit. Arguments pointing towards an ethical leap to
responsible consumerism shall then be reflected in the students’ journal writing, in which
they indicate new perspectives, thoughts or affirmative, just actions for the future.
However, to her dismay, Corinne realises that most of her pupils did not react to the
documentary’s storyline in the way she hoped for: ‘So what?’ How can they remain
indifferent before other children’s suffering and exploitation? Why does her pedagog-
ical practice fail in enabling students to become Other-oriented? What happens when
empathy fails?
Corinne seems to have come to terms with the unexpected feedback by blaming
today’s individualistic and materialistic outlook to life, whereby individuals see them-
selves as distinct and separate from others, in their pursuit to live a good quality life in
comfort. She argues that her students’ concern to look cool in a pair of branded trainers
tampers with their understanding of the distinction between making the right, respon-
sible choices and wrong ones. According to her, it is, thus, possible that materialism,
coupled with individualism, can conceal the commonalities that we share, which could
then lessen our readiness or capacity to feel any consideration for others. Nevertheless,
in view of a recent study carried out by Daryl Cameron et al. (2019), the students’
suppressing feelings of empathy could also be understood as a result of its ‘inherent
cognitive costs’ (11). For example, for some, an empathic understanding of others is
mentally demanding, or it can make them feel unconfident, anxious or upset.
Theme three: The formation of the democratic person
Since its inception, the teaching of Ethics has also been framed as ‘an education for
democratic citizenship’ (Wain 2016). It becomes an instrument for the production of
responsible and moral subjects (see Todd 2003; Biesta 2008, 2011) and suggests a
norm of what it means to be ‘human’. Influenced by Kantian and Hegelian ideas, the
individual is constructed as a rational and autonomous being who possesses agency,
while also endorsing a democratic way of life. It, therefore, becomes evident that the
curriculum is imbued with ideas that root in the Enlightenment and humanism (Biesta
2008). It means that the Ethics curriculum resorts to principles and values that are
understood as being universal and which can be acquired by all, through rationality. A
universalistic discourse becomes promoted as the basis for peaceful coexistence among
different people, and also as a basis of moral guidance vis-à-vis ethical dilemmas. It can
be argued that a universalistic discourse generates a spirit of inclusivity, as reflected in
Corinne and Quinn’s observations, concerning the teaching of Ethics:
Ethics is a universal umbrella, through which we can discuss in a wholly and
holistic way, without excluding anyone [...]. In this regard, Ethics is more
inclusive than the teaching of Religion. (Corinne).
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In Ethics, there is proximity. Students are sitting together, and I find it very
amusing to see them becoming friends, at first, then they get to know towards the
end of the year that, for example, student X is Muslim, or student Y is Reborn
Christian. So, there is this element of seeing the human being first, and then we
see post-religion or post-belief. There is a friendship grounding first. Religion or
the lack of it comes later. (Quinn).
However, this ‘holistic’ (Corinne) discourse, which shall come ‘first’ (Quinn), seems to
have ethical implications since it is founded on an idea of being, which, as explained
earlier, is rooted in the modern Western tradition. This notion favours the common
characteristics of all people over their particularities. Robi Kroflič (2007) argues that a
‘universalistic discourse […] overlook[s] the peculiarities of different, particularly
marginalised groups and individuals and exclude [es] their views, values, needs, and
opinions’ (38). Students, who cannot live up to the norm delineated by the Ethics
curriculum, because they are culturally different, may feel excluded or othered unless
they use their rational faculties to transform themselves and endorse such standards.
However, some students might interpret the curriculum as a tool for Western imperi-
alism, whereby their cultural differences are domesticated through an emphasis on what
they should know and what they should become to live well together. In this regard, the
teaching of Ethics creates an advantage for those students who align themselves with a
Western way of life. At the same time, it alienates or is “violent” against those who are
culturally different.
The religious and cultural other is, thus, doubly rejected and doubly othered. Firstly,
by the NCF and secondly, by the teaching of Ethics. Although on paper, the Curriculum
‘acknowledges Malta’s growing cultural diversity, and values the history and traditions
of its people’ ( 2012, 50), it is still highly influenced by the Catholic Church and does
not, as yet, allow ‘provisions for the teaching of religion to those who are not Catholic’
(Chircop 2018, 103). Added to this, the Ethics Programme, as an available alternative,
requires the religious and cultural Other to transcend their particular otherness and
accept a Westernised value system. It could be argued that the real impetus behind the
implementation of Ethics in schools is to ‘equip newcomers with the cultural tools
needed for participation in [our] particular form of life, and at the same time secures
[our] cultural and social continuity’ (Biesta 2008, 198). The teaching of Ethics becomes
an instrument by which these newcomers are perceived as others and consequently
reduced to the instrumental category of sameness. It becomes a tool to perpetuate a
Eurocentric ‘cultural hegemony’ (Chircop 2008, 75; Borg and Mayo 2006, 36).
Interestingly, Quinn recalls her encounter with a Catholic priest who is convinced
about the alignment of the values promoted by EEP with those of Christianity:
I was accompanying children to confession at school …and, I remember I was
telling the priest how heavy I was feeling about this tension to smoothen out
othering issues in my classroom […], and he told me, ‘Relax you’re teaching
them Roman Catholic values at the end of the day!’ I wasn’t sure what to think.
Okay, I teach about the Golden Rule, which is present in the Abrahamic religions,
and I think across the board […]. But short term, it was a release for me, like a
sigh of relief, although, thinking deeply about it, the Roman Catholic authorities
always want to make sure that we’re not teaching about something else. (Quinn)
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Following this line of thought, one can conclude that philosophy is indeed not
neutral but can serve as an instrument for challenging cherished beliefs and worldviews
to transform subjects to identify with Western culture. This, intentionally or inadver-
tently, may cause discomfort for students whose identities are questioned and, there-
fore, eventually ruptured in the process.
Exemplifying this discomfort, Corinne talks about a situation that occurred during
one of her lessons with Year 7 students (age 11–12), which focused on the topic of
child marriage.
The lesson started with screening a documentary featuring interviews with parents
who were about to marry off their daughters, some as young as 12. Asked about their
motivation, these parents mentioned elopement, exogamy, and the loss of dowry. Their
girls had no other option than to accept what the parents referred to as a cultural
tradition. Following the documentary, those students in the class who had a Western
cultural background, expressed shock and disbelief, blaming the parents for forcing
their children into something they could not bring themselves to imagine.
Corinne, then, involved her students in a discussion about how this practice violates
the girls’ mental and physical wellbeing. Many of her students felt that early marriage
prevents the girls from obtaining an education, burdens them with an adult’s family
responsibilities and puts them at health risks due to early pregnancies. The discussion
then moved on whether they think if certain cultural practices should be abolished due
to their violation of human and children’s rights, to which most of the students
expressed their agreement.
After the lesson, Corinne was approached by a Syrian girl who was quiet in class.
Slightly embarrassed, the girl told Corinne that her mother and grandmother had both
been married at the age of 13. She also explained that she had not wanted to discuss this
in class for fear of judgement by her peers. What until then seemed normal to Corinne,
has suddenly been questioned:
Initially, I was surprised. Although one would assume that those students in a
class who belong to different cultures or different religions, might have similar
experiences, you would not expect them to approach you. At that moment, I
could sense that she was caught between two worlds. The documentary and the
discussion which followed have made her feel uncomfortable, I could sense. I had
not expected this. (Corinne).
Corinne admitted that particular topics while offering a possibility to bring about
personal and social change, might also disturb and discomfort some students as these
make them question their identity. Their cherished beliefs and practices become
interrogated by a dominant moral yardstick. Corinne’s experience, thus, puts into
question the understanding of the Ethics classroom as a safe place to discuss and
debate different practices. The girl’s inhibition to join in the discussion points towards a
perceived conception of superior norms of behaviour. Her relating with the
documentary’s storyline, coupled with her peers’ reaction to the stories, could have
made her see her frame of reference challenged and othered by a discourse in which
people from other cultures are seen as offenders of the rights of people. It is pertinent to
emphasise here that students who are othered by a liberal Western discourse may be
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both foreigners or Maltese, but whose cultural or religious background differs from
what is considered to be the norm.
Given the above, the ethical implications for pedagogical decisions and strategies are
significant because although the Ethics teacher should be ‘objective’, her desire to align
the students to a Westernised curriculum could result in othering the experiences of
students. Teachers, as well as students, with an individualistic mindset, might be unable
to comprehend subjects whose cultural backgrounds and practices differ from their
own, and could judge them as illogical and immoral. They might, willingly or not, try
to “cultivate” the “uncultured” other through logical persuasion. This is not an argu-
ment for moral relativism but a call for caution and sensitivity when encountering the
otherness of the Other. Indeed, Ethics teachers need to be aware of the potential
violence committed on students through structures and practices of othering. Perhaps
adopting a critical stance towards the culture into which we have been socialised and
which dominates the curriculum could open up possibilities of seeing students as
different, through various encounters.
Conclusion
In view of the points discussed in this paper, we deem it relevant to briefly discuss the
notion of responsibility, as developed by Levinas, to be considered as a way forward for
the teaching of Ethics. Julian Edgoose (2005) remarks that, ‘once we have interacted
with the other, we are responsible to her or him because our interaction never gains the
status of closure that, in our interactions with objects enables us, to discard them’ (123).
This could be understood as central for teachers who are engaging with the students who
are others. Levinas considers responsibility to be a burden. He draws our attention to the
fact that being responsible makes us vulnerable as we are required to open up to the
unexpected and unfamiliar otherness. Levinas stresses that the Other can resist us. He
‘can oppose to me a struggle, that is, oppose to the force that strikes him not a force of
resistance, but the very unforseeableness of his reaction’ (Levinas 1969, 199).
Levinas sensitises us to the fact that students’ interaction with the curriculum and the
student-teacher relation are uncharted territories; they are complex, nuanced and
mysteriously unpredictable. The students are Others to teachers, just as the teachers
are Ohers to students. Following Levinas, Edgoose (2005) state that the unpredictability
of the Other can always surpass my assumptions, in different ways and scales. The
uncertainty surrounding the Other in the Ethics classroom results in feelings of
vulnerability, as teachers are vulnerably ‘haunted’ by this fickleness of outcomes
(Edgoose 2005, 123).
Nonetheless, isn’t this vulnerability also part of what it means to be human? Duncan
Mercieca (2007) would answer this question to the affirmative, as he argues:
There are moments when silence or tears need their space. Space needs to be
given so that certain issues are approached with a degree of awe. […] Teachers
need to rekindle these possibilities of discourse, and to note their absence. Let us
keep this astonishment and silence, and perhaps also the experience of pain as
they are. […] Let us allow ourselves and our students to be surprised – to be
violently surprised by the advent of the Other. (156)
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We, therefore, encourage Ethics teachers to resist the teaching of Ethics becoming a
technicality predetermined by learning outcomes, where the teaching of Ethics becomes
merely a technical exercise, requiring skills of content knowledge, behaviour control,
classroom management, and of meeting the predetermined targets (Howard 2005).
Teachers should consider pre-empting the mounting stress to prove the outcomes of
teaching in measurable forms, as in, through project writing, tasks on handouts, oral
and written presentations, and journal writing, which risks skewing the classroom
experience towards industry. One is left to wonder how much time and autonomy is
left for teachers to create educational spaces where students can relate and astonish each
other. An idea of relationality that fosters a kind of philosophical thinking which gives
precedence to the relations among people and their needs (Benjamin, 2015) should
rather be nurtured. Perhaps, then, a move towards, what Dietrich et al. (2003), call, ‘a
Levinasian care ethics’, could help Ethics teachers to respond to students. This would
imply forms of resistance to current inhospitable ways of teaching and thinking, which
perceive students as consumers of education.
Levinas’s thoughts enable Ethics teachers to broaden the scope of ethics beyond its
common understanding to give precedence to the ethical dimension of human relations.
This would lessen, for instance, the violence committed in the name of ethics ‘against
those who do not conform to the dominant ethical norms’ (Butler as cited in Zembylas,
2015, 167). We encourage teachers to navigate human relations in the Ethics classroom
with great cultural sensitivity and responsibility, for example when it comes to their
choice of pedagogical resources, teaching strategies and their engagement with the
vulnerability of students.
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